We report experimental results using a multi-task for simple two-player, two-stage extensive-form games. It is suggested that by creating the perception of a "level playing field" the participants are relieved of responsibility for others since competition on a level playing field is presumed to be fair a priori. Consistent with this suggestion, we find that the vast majority of behavior is individualistic. Moreover, we find that a straightforward extension of the Level-n theory of bounded rationality fits this data remarkably well. Further, we characterize the nonindividualistic behavior as stemming from a combination of utilitarian and Fehr-Schmidt otherregarding preferences.
Introduction.
Our primary research objective is to investigate theories of human behavior in extensiveform games. Experimental studies have cast doubt on the usefulness of game theoretic predictions such as subgame perfection.
1 Ultimatum game bargaining indicates that people are willing to punish unfair or unkind behavior at a monetary cost to themselves. In trust, gift exchange, and contribution games, people exhibit a willingness to incur a cost to attain a fair outcome and reward kind behavior. Possible explanations include other-regarding preferences, hot and cold emotional decisions, path-dependent phenomena, bounded rationality, and experimental procedures.
Game theory assumes that a player's preferences over potential material consequences to all players are represented by the player's own expected utility function of those consequences and the player's beliefs (subjective probabilities). Any regard for the consequences impacting other players is implicitly included in this expected utility function. The definition of a game gives these expected utility "payoffs" as a primitive. Under the standard interpretation, a player's own expected utility payoffs and beliefs are sufficient to determine Bayesian rational choices. In other words, every player is by definition "individualistic" in the expected utility payoffs.
Unfortunately, this strict interpretation presents an obstacle to empirical testing of game theory, since in practice the expected utility functions are not observable. While the study of specifications of expected utility functions that incorporate other-regarding preferences, path effects, etc. is a vital research area, the testing of theory predictions conditional on the utility payoffs is also important. The latter requires players to be individualistic in the experimenter designated payoffs.
Experimental designs attempt to control for unobservables in various ways. For example, unobservable risk attitudes can sometimes be controlled for by using binary lotteries as payoffs.
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Group sizes of six or more have been shown to induce individualistic behavior in many-person dictator games (Haruvy and Stahl, 2002) and in public good contribution games (Isaac and Walker, 1988) , which suggests that mean-matching designs with typically sized laboratory groups tend to induce individualistic behavior.
The Experiment and Data.
2.1. The Experimental Design. Figure 1 shows the six two-stage games used in these experiments. The payoffs are in terms of binary lotteries, giving the probability of winning $5.00 for each game. The games chosen are discretized versions of the sometimes more complex parallels in the literature. For example, offers in the traditional Ultimatum game are usually continuous. The traditional GiftExchange game similarly has more choices for wage and effort levels, whereas we have two choices for each. The Trust game traditionally has a continuum of choices, whereas we had two.
These simplifications are necessary if these games are to be presented together in a unified fashion and in a way the subjects can and will comprehend following simple instructions.
Nevertheless, we believe that the essence of each game was captured in these simple choices.
Four sessions were run at the Harvard Business School; the first three of these involved 36 participants each and the first five games listed in Figure 1 . The fourth Harvard session involved 30 participants, and the sixth game listed in Figure 1 was substituted for the fourth game; in other words, a fifth branch with payoffs of (100, 0) was added to the Ultimatum game.
Fifth and sixth sessions with 18 participants each were conducted at the University of Texas at Austin.
All six sessions entailed reading of the instructions, and an independent choice prior to the five extensive-form games. The independent task was a six-person dictator game, in which the participants were anonymously assigned to groups of six, and one member of each group was anonymously picked to be the dictator for that group. Due to regulations at Harvard, individually signed receipts had to be obtained 6 , so we were concerned that the participants would worry that their decisions could be exposed using the signed receipts. To make such linkage impossible, all sessions at Harvard were preceded by a simple lottery that gave each participant a prize of $20 with probability 1/10. Neither the lottery outcome nor the dictator game outcomes were revealed prior to playing the extensive-form games; it was common knowledge that there was no linkage between the dictator game and the extensive-form games;
and absolute privacy was guaranteed. Instructions are given in the Appendix. All lotteries were carried out independently at the end of the experiment after all decisions had been made. 6 At the University of Texas at Austin, three non-participant witnesses signed an affidavit verifying the total amount of money dispersed to the session participants; thus, names, ID numbers, etc. could not be associated with any participant's earnings or choices.
In social psychology it is well known that group labels can create a "we-they" dichotomy (Messick and Mackie, 1989) . Since the sequential games we investigate are natural for a twopopulation design (first movers and second movers), we initially called one population the Red team and the other population the Blue team. Theoretically, this Red-Blue team framing should induce a competitive environment between first and second movers neutralizing other-regarding behavior across teams, and indeed we found a preponderance of individualistic behavior. The first session also used mean matching and the strategy method. Each first mover was matched with each second mover, and received the average payoff from all such matches. Each second mover had to provide a conditional choice at each decision node of the game.
To test whether the Red-Blue team framing was driving the individualistic behavior, the second session dropped the team framing, but kept everything else unchanged. This made no discernible difference in the behavior (measured by standard Chi-square tests). Next to test whether the mean matching was driving the individualistic behavior, the third session also dropped the team framing and used pairwise random matching with reshuffled pairings for each game. Again, this made no discernible difference in behavior. To test whether the multiple prizes were driving the behavior, the fourth session was like the third except that a single prize of $25 was paid for just one of the five games; this game was selected by the random draw of a card at the beginning of the experiment, but not revealed until the end of the experiment. Once again, this made no discernible difference in behavior. The two sessions at the University of Texas at Austin replicated the second and third Harvard sessions, with no statistically significant difference in behavior.
Finally, to test whether the preliminary choice task in the six-person dictator game was driving the individualistic behavior, we conducted two additional sessions at UT-Austin without the preceding dictator game, but otherwise identical to session 6. Table I summarizes the protocols of all eight sessions. Once again, this made no discernible difference in behavior. Chisquare tests of the Austin sessions 5-8 could not reject the hypothesis that they were generated by the same process. Thus, the presence or absence of the six-person dictator appears to be inconsequential.
In total, we have 111 observations of first-mover and second-mover choices for Games 1-3 and 5; 96 observations for Game 4; and 15 observations for Game 6. The aggregate choices are also shown on Figure 1 (in parentheses). Chi-square tests of the aggregate choices across the 6 eight sessions could not reject the hypothesis that they were generated by the same process.
Therefore, our subsequent analysis focuses on the pooled aggregate data. consistent with subgame perfect equilibrium: 91.9% for second movers and 65.2% for first movers. It does not follow that first movers had more regard for others since such first-mover behavior could be rationalized with individualistic preferences and non-equilibrium beliefs. Of the first-mover choices that are not subgame perfect, two-thirds are consistent with level-1 types; in all, 88.5% of first-mover choices appear individualistic. Particularly remarkable are the Ultimatum game results, which contrast with the median division of 60:40 typically observed (e.g., Roth, 1995) ; further, the 80:20 offer was rarely rejected. In the Contribution, GiftExchange and Trust games, there is little positive reciprocity to first-mover generosity, and in the Entry and Ultimatum games, there is little negative reciprocity.
Level-n Bounded Rationality for Two-Move Sequential Games.
The Level-n model of bounded rationality (Stahl and Wilson, 1995) has a straightforward extension to two-move sequential games. It postulates a population of types, called Level-n types, in which Level-0 types are uniformly random, Level-1 types believe that all other players are Level-0 types, and Level-2 types believe that all other players are Level-0 and Level-1 types.
The proportions of each type in the population are free variables to be estimated. The simplest hypothesis is that these proportions are the same whether a player is a first-mover or a secondmover. Of course, this hypothesis can and will be tested. We start with the null hypothesis of role-independent proportions.
Second-Movers.
In accordance with backward induction, we begin our analysis with the second movers.
Since the second movers are the last movers in these games, they do not need a mental model of the other players. A Level-n (n ≥ 1) type simply chooses a logit best response given the available choices at each node. Letting ν denote the precision of this logit best response, the probability of a Level-1 (for brevity) type choosing j at node m in game g is
where k ranges over the choices at node m in game g, and y 2gmk is the respective second mover payoff (as given in Figure 1 ). To accommodate unsystematic behavior and trembles, we also define a Level-0 type as being equally likely to choose each available action at each node.
Letting α 0 denote the proportion of the second mover population that is as the proportion of Level-1 types, and letting x gm (j) denote the aggregate second-mover choices of j at node m in game g, the log-likelihood of the second-mover data is
(2) Note also that there is no difference between Nash behavior and Level-1 behavior, so Nash types and Stahl-Wilson worldly types are indistinguishable from Level-1 types.
First Movers.
Level-0 first-movers choose each first-mover branch with equal probability. Level-1 types choose a logit best response to the belief that each second mover choice is equally likely. Letting ν denote the precision of this logit best response, the probability of a Level-1 first mover choosing branch leading to node m in game g is
where k ranges over the branches of game g, and 1gk y is the average first-mover payoff following branch k. Level-2 first movers believe that second movers are Level-1 types with precision µ, and therefore believe that second-mover choice probabilities are given by eq(1): ) (j, P gm µ . Hence, the first-mover's expected payoff for choosing branch leading to node m is
(4) Then, the probability that a Level-2 first mover chooses branch leading to node m is given by
Let α 0 denote the proportion of the first mover population that is Level-0, α 1 the proportion that is Level-1, leaving α 2 = (1-α 0 -α 1 ) as the proportion that is Level-2. Let x g (m) denote the aggregate first-mover choices of the branch leading to node m in game g, and let B g denote the number of first-mover branches in game g. Then, the log-likelihood of the first-mover data is
Note that subgame perfect behavior corresponds to Level-2 behavior, so such types are indistinguishable from Level-2 types.
Maximum Likelihood Estimation of Level-n Model.
In previous research 8 , we have found strong evidence that when fitting choice data with probabilistic choice functions of the logit form with a single precision parameter, the fit is better when the payoffs are rescaled to [0, 100] for each game. Accordingly, in the subsequent analysis, each payoff (y) in game g was transformed to 100(y -m g )/(M g -m g ), where M g (m g ) is the maximum (minimum) payoff over both players in game g.
Summing eqs(2) and (6) produces the log-likelihood function under the null hypothesis that the proportions of types and the logit precision are independent of roles. Maximizing this function yields LL = -803.99. As a benchmark the entropy of the data is -767.04, so we have a pseudo-R 2 of 0.954. Table I gives the estimates and confidence intervals for this model. Setting α 1 = 0 yields a model with level-0 types and level-2 types; the latter can be interpreted as logit subgame perfect Nash equilibrium types. The maximized LL drops dramatically to -885.10; thereby strongly rejecting the restriction. In other words, level-1 behavior makes a significant contribution to explaining the data, so we must reject subgame perfection.
The Root-Mean Squared Error (RMSE) is 0.064 for first movers and 0.042 for second movers. On the other hand, the Pearson Chi-Square (PCS) good-of-fit statistic is 72.31, which with 32 degrees of freedom 9 has a p-value of 6×10 -5 ; thus, we can reject the hypothesis that the data were generated by this fitted model. type is not shown in Figure 2 since it is the uniform distribution over the available strategies.
For second movers, since there are two branches at every such node, only the probability of choosing the left branch is displayed. Comparing the predictions of the mixture model with the actual choice frequencies, the fit is remarkably good, with four exceptions.
For second movers the fit is poor for the Contribution game (2) by PCS and RMSE standards; the participants show positive reciprocity when getting more than the first mover (23% choose LA versus the model prediction of 14%), and negative reciprocity when getting less (7% choose RB versus the model prediction of 4%). Utilitarian or egalitarian preferences could help predict the positive reciprocity, but spitefulness is needed to predict the negative reciprocity.
For first movers, the fit is poor for the Entry, Ultimatum and Trust games (1, 4 and 5); more first movers enter in game 1 than predicted (76 versus 61%); more offer close to half in the Ultimatum game (18% versus 9%); and more invest fully in the Trust game than predicted (15% versus 8%). Utilitarian or egalitarian preferences could help predict the Ultimatum game behavior, and utilitarian but not egalitarian preferences could help predict the Trust game behavior. Extreme egalitarian preferences could help predict the Entry game behavior.
Thus, it appears that the departures from the predictions of the fitted Level-n model cannot be explained by a single other-regarding preference type. In the next section, we present a parsimonious model of this apparently other-regarding behavior.
A Level-n Model with Other-Regarding Behavior.
In addition to the Level-0 type, and the individualistic Level-1 and Level-2 types, suppose there is an other-regarding (OR) type, and let α 3 denote the latter proportion in the population.
Deferring the specification of OR preferences until later, let ) (m, Q 1 g ν denote the OR first-mover logistic choice function with precision ν for game g and node m given level-0 beliefs, and let β denote the proportion of OR types that have these beliefs. Let ) , (m, Q 2 g µ ν denote the OR first-mover logistic choice function with precision ν given the belief that the second-mover has OR preferences and precision µ. Then, if the subject has OR preferences, the probabilistic choice function in the first-mover role is given by
Finally, let ) (j, Q gm ν denote the OR second-mover logistic choice function with precision ν for game g, node m and strategy j.
A natural hypothesis is that β = α 1 /(α 1 +α 2 ). On the other hand, since OR types are implicitly forward-looking in the sense of having regard for the subsequent consequences to others, it might be that virtually all OR types believe others are also rational OR types rather than irrational level-0 types (i.e. β = 0). When we allowed β to be free, the maximum likelihood estimate was exactly 0. Henceforth, we set β = 0.
We assume that an individualistic type believes the other players are individualistic.
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Weighting by preference type, for a random subject, the probabilistic choice function in the firstmover role is given by
and in the second-mover role by
We now come to the challenging problem of specifying the OR preferences. From section 4, instances of poor fit suggest that two types of OR behavior are present: utilitarianism to account for the amount of trust in game 5, and spite to account for negative reciprocity in game 2. To capture such behavior, we use the two-parameter Fehr-Schmidt model in which 10 Using standard methods, we could not reject this hypothesis. U 1 (y 1 ,y 2 ) = y 1 + θ 1 min{y 2 -y 1 ,0} + θ 2 max{y 2 -y 1 ,0} , and (8) U 2 (y 1 ,y 2 ) = y 2 + θ 1 min{y 1 -y 2 ,0} + θ 2 max{y 1 -y 2 ,0} , where θ 1 ≥ 0 and (for convexity) θ 2 ≤ θ 1 . Utilitarian preferences are represented by θ 1 = θ 2 = 1/2. Spiteful preferences are represented by θ 2 < 0 < θ 1 . As an initial hypothesis, we assume that θ 1 = 1/2, and that θ 2 = 1/2 or -1 with equal probability.
11 Thus, with one additional parameter (α 3 ),
we have an encompassing model with individualistic and OR preferences.
The maximized LL of this encompassing model is -782.99, an increase of 21.00 which has a p-value less than 9×10 -11 . Therefore, this addition of OR preferences makes a very statistically significant contribution to explaining the data. The pseudo-R 2 is a remarkable 0.980.
Moreover, the PCS goodness-of-fit statistic decreases to 32.72, which has a p-value of 0.431; therefore, we cannot reject the hypothesis that this model is the data generating process. Finally, the RMSE decreases to 0.032. Table II gives the parameter estimates and confidence intervals for this model. individualistic preferences. In other words, the level playing field design appears to have worked for 84% of the participants.
It is also noteworthy that the estimated proportion of Level-0 types decreases substantially and the estimated precision parameter (ν) increases, because the way a model with only individualistic preferences tries to fit OR behavior is as random error (i.e. a larger α 0 or a smaller ν). The proportion of individualistic Level-2 types remains essentially the same at about 60%. Thus, OR behavior appears to crowd out Level-0 and individualistic Level-1 behavior, but not individualistic Level-2 behavior.
We tested the restrictions on OR preferences that θ 1 = 1/2, and that θ 2 = 1/2 or -1 with equal probability by considering an encompassing model with two subtypes of OR preferences:
(i) utilitarian (θ 1 = θ 2 = 1/2), and (ii) general Fehr-Schmidt (θ 1 ≥ 0 and θ 2 ≤ θ 1 ). Further, we allowed the relative proportion of these subtypes to be a free parameter. The maximized LL increased by only 0.67, which with 3 degrees of freedom has a p-value of 0.72. Therefore, we cannot reject the restrictions entailed by our specification of OR preferences.
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To test the validity of pooling first-mover and second-mover behavior, we fitted the model for each role separately. The increase in the maximized LL was 2.40, which with two degrees of freedom has a p-value of 0.188. Therefore, we cannot reject the hypothesis of a common set of parameters for both roles.
The overall earning performance of each type is the expected payoff that type would have received when facing the actual empirical distribution of play in the data set. Sophisticated learning (e.g., rule learning as proposed by Stahl, 2000) and evolutionary dynamics would predict that those types with above average earning performance would increase their share of the population, while those types with below average earning performance would decrease their share. 13 Table III gives this overall performance measure for the five types; since the performance calculated separately for first movers and second movers are very similar, only the combined performance measure is reported here. The column labeled "Util" stands for the utilitarian component of the OR type, while "FS" stands for the Fehr-Schmidt component with θ 1
12 Alternative specifications of OR preferences such as CES and Cox-Friedman (2002) made no improvement. 13 We are ssuming, as in Guth, Kliemt and Peleg (2000) , that survival fitness depends on the material payoffs rather than the utility payoffs for the other-regarding types as well as the individualistic types.
= 1/2, and θ 2 = -1. The "Average" row is computed by weighting each game by the number of subjects. The Level-2 type (which leads to subgame perfect behavior) is the highest overall performer, and hence we would expect to see the Level-2 share increase in a subsequent period. The Utilitarian type and the Level-0 type are the poorest performers, and hence we would expect to see their shares decrease. This change in the population would make the Level-2 type perform even better in subsequent periods. Consequently, rapid convergence to the subgame perfect equilibria is quite likely. This conjecture can be empirically tested in a future study.
Discussion.
A large body of experimental literature has demonstrated that utility functions may be more complex than selfish monetary considerations alone. Unfortunately, it may take many more years before all possible non-pecuniary considerations are mapped and game theoretic predictions can be tested with these new 'complete' utility functions. Until then, we have argued that proper testing of game theoretic predictions requires experimental designs in which participants care only about their own payoffs. We found that participants were predominantly individualistic in our design. The maximum-likelihood results for both the individualistic Leveln model and the extended model with OR types suggest that our design succeeded in inducing the intended game-theoretic payoffs for at least 84% of the participants. Further, behavior appears quite robust to many variations of the multi-task design, including team framing, meanmatching versus random pairwise matching, and single versus multiple prizes. This evidence suggests that the multi-task design succeeds by creating the perception of a level playing field thereby absolving participants of responsibility for other participants.
We presented the OR extension to satisfy the anticipated curiosity of readers, and to gain some insight about the behavior that is not well-fit by the individualistic Level-n model. That behavior contains elements of utilitarianism and spitefulness. We presented a model with individualistic Level-0, Level-1 and Level-2 types and one hybrid OR type which was either utilitarian or spiteful with equal probability. The improvement in all goodness-of-fit measures was substantial and significant, and we could not reject the hypothesis that the data were generated by the fitted model.
We are surprised that the simple Level-n model of first movers does so well. Based on past studies of the Ultimatum game, which found near equal splits to be the modal choice, we expected that the naive Level-1 belief that second movers are equally likely to make any choice at every node would be unreasonable, since such belief would lead to the first mover demanding all or most of the pie. Instead, we contemplated an alternative conceptualization of secondmover strategies in terms of reservation levels: accept any offer equal to or exceeding, say, r.
Then, if each such reservation level is equally likely, the first mover's optimal proposal would be a 50-50 split. In contrast, the 80-20 split is the predominant first-mover proposal in our data, consistent with the naive Level-1 type.
Also pertinent to explaining our Ultimatum behavior is the large proportion of Level-2 types (about 60%) in comparison to Stahl-Wilson (1995) , and Haruvy, Stahl and Wilson (2001) .
However, since Level-2, naïve Nash and Worldly types are indistinguishable in our extensiveform data, the comparison should be with the sum of those types in the previous studies, and that sum is around 60%.
Future research will explore how robust our findings are to the games used in a multi-task design, and what design features are necessary and sufficient to create the perception of a level playing field. For instance, we suspect that it is important to present all games simultaneously, so participants can ascertain from the very beginning that there are no obvious biases in role assignments.
Figure 1. Experiment Games.
Game 3 -Gift-Exchange Game: Game 4 -Ultimatum Game: Game 1 -Entry Game: Game 2 -Contribution Game:
Game 5 -Trust Game: Game 6 -Ultimatum Game: 
EXPERIMENT INSTRUCTIONS

KEY: Explanatory text has been inserted into these Appendices and is italicized. All nonitalicized text is directly from the actual instructions which were read aloud, except for the text in brackets [].
Appendix A: Harvard Instructions for Team-Framing Treatment.
Welcome. [Introduce self and helpers. Say how everyone was recruited.]
This is an experiment about economic decision making. If you follow the instructions carefully you might earn a considerable amount of money. This money will be paid at the end of the experiment in private and in cash. [Wave cash.] Any participant that showed up at least 5 minutes early will receive a $5 bonus. In addition, each participant will receive $5 as compensation for participating in this experiment, which will last about one hour. Additional bonus payments will depend on the decisions that you and other participants make in the experiment; how these additional payments will be determined will be explained in detail momentarily.
It is important that during the experiment you remain SILENT. If you have any questions, or need assistance of any kind, RAISE YOUR HAND but DO NOT SPEAK. One of the experiment administrators will come to you and you may whisper your question to him. If you talk, laugh, or exclaim out loud, you will be asked to leave and will not be paid. We expect and appreciate your cooperation.
You will be making choices using the computer mouse and keyboard. You may reposition the mouse pad so it is comfortable for you. Your mouse cursor should move when you slide the mouse on the pad. If not, please raise your hand. Do NOT click the mouse buttons or use the keypad until told to do so. [The screen will be blank until everybody clicks on the begin button -but not yet.]
You will be making a number of decisions, but the outcomes of these decisions will not be revealed to anyone until the end of the experiment after all decisions have been made. Each decision will count in determining your total earnings.
Please click on the BEGIN button on your screen. Once you have done this, the screen will display the first decision. Please listen to my instructions.
We will now describe the first decision task. You will click on the box on the right side of Decision 1 and enter an integer from 1 to 10. At the end of the experiment, an integer from 1 to 10 will be randomly drawn, and if it is equal to your choice, you will win $20.
Click on the box for Decision 1 now and make your decision. [Pause 30 seconds.] If you haven't made a decision yet, do it now and stop.
Following this decision, some of you will have earned $30 ($20 from Decision 1, $5 for participating, plus $5 for showing up early). Others will have earned $25, $10, or only $5. The remaining decisions in this experiment will add further earnings. In the end, there will be no way to infer from your total earnings what choice you made on any particular decision. Also, your consent form, which by now should be signed by you, made it clear that your receipts will not be kept by the researcher after the experiment, and that your name and identifying information will never be linked with any of the data. Any attempt to link decision to a person would be deemed a serious violation of the Human Subjects Protocol and Harvard Protection of Human Subjects. Therefore, rest assured that your choices are completely private and anonymous. Now please click on "WAIT FOR THE EXPERIMENTER'S SIGNAL". Your screen now says "to move onto the next decision click on the button below. Click on OK now. Please listen to my instructions.
We will now describe the second decision task. The computer has randomly assigned each of you to six groups of six participants each (show slide of groups), as illustrated on the video monitors. One participant in each group has been randomly selected to be the Decision Maker. Your screen will indicate in the text for Decision 2 whether or not you are the Decision Maker in your group. The groupings and designation of the Decision Makers for the previous decision task, will not apply to any of the remaining decision tasks.
Each of the next five decisions you face will be described by a Tree that will be displayed on the video monitor. I will now display an example of a Tree in order to explain what it means. Please look at a video monitor while I describe the tree. CAUTION, this is an example and is not the Tree for any of your decision tasks. In the example Tree displayed, if you are on the Red team, you get to move first. If you are on the Blue team, you move second. The first mover in the above tree decides between A, B, or C. The second mover, a member of the blue team, must make three distinct choices: one choice between LA and RA that will be carried out if and only if the first mover chooses A; one choice between LB and RB that will be carried out if and only if the first mover chooses ; and one choice between LC and RC that will be carried out if and only if the first mover chooses C.
Final payments will be determined as follows. The computer will match each Red team member with each Blue team member. The decisions of each matched pair will determine a unique path in the tree. For example, suppose the Red team member in the above tree chose A; and the Blue team member chose (LA, RB, RC), the unique path will consist of [ Since there are 18 members of each team, each Red team member will be matched 18 times (once for each of the 18 Blue team members). The points you received for each match will be summed and then divided by 18, so your total "payoff" will be the average points you receive.
At the end of the experiment these payoff numbers will be converted to dollars in a lottery in which for each decision you can win $5 or nothing, and the probability of winning is equal to your payoff; in other words, a payoff of 75 will give you a 75% chance of winning $5. Thus, the higher your payoff for each decision, the greater your chance of winning $5 for that decision. The lotteries for each participant and each decision will be separate and independent. We will also report the sum of the payoffs for the Red team and Blue team.
The five Trees, one for each decision task on your screen, will be displayed on the video monitors. We will also pass out hard copies of these Trees for your convenience. Your decisions must be entered as capitalized letters, so please press your Caps Lock key now. Press your Caps Lock key now. [Pause] You will have 7.5 minutes in which to make all five decisions. NO further instructions will be given. You may make these decisions in any order, and you may change any of these decisions by clicking on the corresponding box, deleting what's there using the backspace and/or delete keys, and retyping a new choice. The clock on your screen will display the time remaining.
CAUTION: If you fail to make a choice for any of the decisions, $5 will be subtracted from your total earnings.
[Begin passing out hard copies, with a front cover that says DO NOT TURN PAGE UNTIL TOLD TO DO SO. Pause until all hard copies are passed out.]
You will now call up the screen with these decision tasks. Click on "WAIT FOR THE EXPERIMENTER'S SIGNAL". The clock will start as soon as click on the OK button. At that time, you may turn the page of the handout and begin making your decisions. Do not stop until you have made all five decisions. After making all five decisions, you may reconsider your decisions, but you may not stand up or speak. Click on OK now.
Appendix B. Harvard Instructions for Non-Team Framing Treatments.
The welcoming remarks and instructions for the first and second decision tasks were identical to those given in Appendix A.
The groupings and designation of the Decision Makers for the previous decision task, will not apply to any of the remaining decision tasks.
For the One-Prize treatment, the following paragraph was inserted. "Only one of the next five decisions (numbered 3-7) will be used to determine additional monetary payments. I am going to ask one of you to pick a card from a stack of five cards numbered 2, 3,... 7 on the underside (show cards). We will put the card picked aside, and after everyone has made all five decisions, we will turn the card over and the revealed number will be the decision problem that is carried out to determine additional monetary payments."
Each of the next five decisions you face will be described by a Tree that will be displayed on the video monitor. I will now display an example of a Tree in order to explain what it means. Please look at a video monitor while I describe the tree. CAUTION, this is an example and is not the Tree for any of your decision tasks.
A Tree consists of nodes and branches. The first (top) node and its branches are Red, while the second (lower) nodes and branches are Blue. Half of the participants in this room (18) will choose among the Red branches and we will call them "First Movers", and the other half of the participants will choose among the Blue branches and we will call them "Second Movers". Your role as First or Second Mover will not be the same for all decision problems.
[Show Slide 1.]
In the example Tree displayed, if you are the First Mover, you choose between A, B, and C. If you are the Second Mover, you make three distinct choices: one choice between LA and RA that will be carried out if and only if the First Mover chooses A; one choice between LB and RB that will be carried out if and only if the First Mover chooses ; and one choice between LC and RC that will be carried out if and only if the First Mover chooses C.
Final payments will be determined as follows. The computer will match each First Mover with each Second Mover. The decisions of each matched pair will determine a unique path in the tree.
For pairwise matching treatments, the above paragraph read as follows. "Final payments will be determined as follows. The computer will randomly divide everyone into pairs: one member of each pair will be the First Mover and the other will be the Second Mover. The decisions of each matched pair will determine a unique path in the tree."
For example, in the above tree suppose the First Mover chose A; and the Second Mover chose (LA, RB, RC), the unique path will consist of [show Slide 2] the A branch, followed by the LA branch, ending in the box with the numbers (20, 35) . In this case, the First Mover will receive 20 points and the Second Mover will receive 35 points. Note that the payoffs for the First Mover will always be shown first and in red, while the payoffs for the Second Mover will always be shown second and in blue. On the other hand, if the Second Mover had chosen (RA, LB, RC) the unique path would have been [show Slide 3] branch A, followed by branch RA, ending in the box with numbers (40, 15) . In this match, the First Mover would have received 40 points while the Second Mover received 15 points.
From the point of view of the Second Mover, suppose he/she chose (LA, RB, RC).
[ Since there will be 18 participants in each role, each First Mover will be matched 18 times (once for each of the 18 Second Movers). The points you received for each match will be summed and then divided by 18, so your total "payoff" will be the average points you receive.
For pairwise matching treatments, the above paragraph read as follows. "For each subsequent decision task, the computer will reshuffle the pairing, so everyone will be paired with five different people. Recall that your role as First or Second Mover will not be the same for all decision tasks."
At the end of the experiment these payoff numbers will be converted to dollars in a lottery in which for each decision you can win $5 or nothing, and the probability of winning is equal to your payoff; in other words, a payoff of 75 will give you a 75% chance of winning $5. Thus, the higher your payoff for each decision, the greater your chance of winning $5 for that decision. The lotteries for each participant and each decision will be separate and independent.
For the One-Prize treatment, the above paragraph read as follows. "At the end of the experiment, we will turn the card over, and your payoff for that decision will be converted to dollars in a lottery in which you can win $25 or nothing, and the probability of winning is equal to your payoff; in other words, a payoff of 75 points will give you a 75% chance of winning $25. Thus, the higher your payoff for each decision, the greater your chance of winning $25 for that decision. The lotteries for each participant will be separate and independent."
The five Trees, one for each decision task on your screen, will be displayed on the video monitors. We will also pass out hard copies of these Trees for your convenience. For each of the five decisions, your computer screen (and only your computer screen) will tell you whether you are a First Mover or a Second Mover. You will not be in the same role for all decisions.
Your decisions must be entered as capitalized letters, so please press your Caps Lock key now. Press your Caps Lock key now. [Pause] You will have 7.5 minutes in which to make all five decisions. NO further instructions will be given. You may make these decisions in any order, and you may change any of these decisions by clicking on the corresponding box, deleting what's there using the backspace and/or delete keys, and retyping a new choice. The clock on your screen will display the time remaining.
Appendix C. UT Instructions
Welcome. [Introduce self and helpers. Say how everyone was recruited.] This is an experiment about economic decision making. If you follow the instructions carefully you might earn a considerable amount of money. This money will be paid at the end of the experiment in private and in cash. [Wave cash.] Every participant will receive $5 as compensation for participating in this experiment, which will last about one hour. Additional bonus payments will depend on the decisions that you and other participants make in the experiment; how these additional payments will be determined will be explained in detail momentarily.
You will be making choices using the computer mouse and keyboard. You may reposition the mouse pad so it is comfortable for you. Your mouse cursor should move when you slide the mouse on the pad. If not, please raise your hand. Do NOT click the mouse buttons or use the keypad until told to do so. The screen will be blank until everybody clicks on the begin button -but not yet.
We will now describe the first decision task. The computer has randomly assigned each of you to 8 groups of three participants each (show slide of groups), as illustrated on the overhead. One participant in each group has been randomly selected to be the Decision Maker for this decision task. Each of you has an equal chance of being the Decision Maker. Your screen (when it appears) will indicate whether or not you are the Decision Maker in your group. No one will know which group they belong to, or who is in their group, and the identity of the Decision Makers will never be made public. You will be identified only by a randomly assigned Participant number. Your money earnings will be given to you in an envelope identified only by your Participant number. You will not be asked to sign a receipt or in any way associate your name, Social Security number or any other personal information with your choices or money earnings. Thus, absolute anonymity and privacy will be ensured.
Click on page down.
If you are the Decision Maker, then you decide how much of $10 (0 -10) to keep for yourself; the amount you do not keep will be divided equally among the other 2 members of your group. The groupings and designation of the Decision Makers for the previous decision task, will not apply to any of the remaining decision tasks.
Each of the next five decisions you face will be described by a Tree that will be displayed on the overhead. I will now display an example of a Tree in order to explain what it means. Please look at the overhead while I describe the tree. CAUTION, this is an example and is not the Tree for any of your decision tasks. Instead of the maximin payoffs, suppose the reference point is affected by the average payoff (a ig ) in the game. To test this hypothesis, let the reference point be given by r ig = βa ig .
The MLE parameter estimates of this model and the maximized LL are given in the fourth column of the above table. The result is virtually the same as for the maximin version.
Therefore, we reject this hypothesis as well.
The above two alternatives do not take account of differences among nodes. One way to remedy this failure is to compute the reference point by node 14 , while maintaining the assumption that the "node-conditioned" reference point is common knowledge. The MLE parameter estimates for the node-conditioned maximin model and the node-conditioned average model are given in columns 5 and 6 of the above table. The largest increase in LL is only 0.89, which with one degree of freedom, has a p-value of 0.345. Therefore, we reject these nodeconditioned alternatives as well.
Another method of letting OR preferences depend on history is to assume preferences are linear: u 1 (y 1 ,y 2 ) = y 1 + θ 1n (y 2 -y 1 ), and u 2 (y 1 ,y 2 ) = y 2 + θ 2n (y 1 -y 2 ) where θ in depends on the node.
Let y in denote the average payoff to player i at the terminal nodes that follow node n, weighting each terminal node equally. Then, define z 1n = (y 1n -y 2n ) -β(a 1g -a 2g ), and z 2n = (y 2n -y 1n ) -β(a 2g -a 1g ). In words, z in is the advantage of player i at node n, adjusted for his advantage in the whole game. We then specify θ in = λz in /(1 + λz in ) if z in ≥ 0, and θ in = γλz in otherwise;
where λ and γ are non-negative parameters. Thus, when player i has a positive advantage relative to the game, he becomes more generous (0 < θ in < 1), and when player i has a disadvantage relative to the game, he becomes more spiteful (θ in < 0). Despite the three extra parameters (β, λ and γ), the maximized LL is -782.92, which is worse than our base model.
Therefore we reject this method of node-conditioning as well.
Appendix II. Alternative Specification of Beliefs.
In the model of section 5, we initially allowed for the possibility that OR first movers believe second movers are either individualistic level-1 types or OR level-1 types, in which β is the proportion of the former. We then asserted that β = 0. We will present that test here. In addition, we assumed that individual level-2 first movers believe second movers are individualistic level-1 types. Alternatively, we could allow for the possibility that they believe second movers are OR types. Let
denote the expected utility of the first mover from choosing branch m in game g given the belief that the second mover is an OR type with precision µ. Then, the probability that such a first mover chooses branch m is given by This result is consistent with the "projection" hypothesis of psychology: that a person tends to model others like oneself. Here, an individualist believes everyone else is individualistic, while an other-regarding person believes everyone else is other-regarding also [e.g. Croson and Miller (2003) , "Explaining the Relationship between Actions and Beliefs: Projection vs. Reaction." ] 14 I.e. at node n, the maximin level is computed over the set of nodes excluding node n.
